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Disciplinary Regulation of Prosecutorial Discretion: 
What Would a Rule Look Like? 
Samuel J. Levine* 
Abstract 
This Essay is the third part of a larger project examining the potential role 
of professional discipline in the regulation and supervision of prosecutors’ 
charging decisions.  The first two parts of the project argued that courts 
have both the authority and the ability to exercise effective disciplinary 
review of charging decisions through the adoption of ethics rules and their 
enforcement in the disciplinary process.  This Essay takes the next step in 
the project, considering the nature of rules that courts might adopt, by 
exploring potential rules targeting two improprieties: arbitrary and 
capricious charging decisions, and discriminatory charging decisions. 
I. INTRODUCTION
This Essay is the third part of a larger project exploring the possibility that 
disciplinary review of prosecutors’ charging decisions—through both expansive 
judicial interpretation of current ethics rules and judicial enactment and enforcement 
of more extensive ethics rules—might serve as a viable and effective mechanism for 
meaningful regulation and supervision of prosecutorial discretion.1 
The first part of this project, developed in an article co-authored with Bruce 
Green, responded to a common assumption among scholars that professional 
* Professor of Law and Director of the Jewish Law Institute, Touro Law Center.  Earlier
versions of this Essay were presented at the Criminal Justice Ethics Schmooze, hosted at New York 
Law School and at Brooklyn Law School.  I thank the organizers and participants for helpful comments, 
and I thank Bruce Green for his thoughtful guidance and collaboration throughout this project.  Finally, 
I thank Bruce, Ellen Yaroshefsky, and Peter Joy for inviting me to contribute to this symposium issue 
dedicated to Bennett Gershman.  I appreciate Ben’s pioneering scholarship and personal friendship, 
and I am honored to participate in this symposium. 
1   This project aims to contribute to the continuing efforts to identify and suggest remedies for 
various forms of prosecutorial misconduct, documented for decades by Ben Gershman and others. 
Ben’s treatise, BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, which he regularly updates, first 
appeared in 1985. 
Much of the scholarship in this area focuses on the enormous power prosecutors wield in the 
charging decision, and the ongoing problem of abuse of charging discretion.  See, e.g., BENNETT L. 
GERSHMAN, PROSECUTION STORIES (2017); Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Decisionmaking and 
Discretion in the Charging Function, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1259, 1260 (2011) (“A prosecutor's charging 
decision is the heart of the prosecution function . . . [T]he prosecutor's charging decision involves an 
enormous exercise of power . . . [and] that power is virtually unreviewable.”); Bennett L. Gershman, 
Prosecutorial Ethics and Victims' Rights: The Prosecutor's Duty of Neutrality, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
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discipline is not a viable means of regulating prosecutors' charging discretion.2  In 
particular, influenced by federal constitutional decisions, many scholars seem to 
accept the premise that principles of separation of powers preclude state courts from 
regulating prosecutors’ charging decisions.3  Relying on a close examination of state 
REV. 559, 563 (2005) (describing the “prosecutor's enormous power over people's lives, liberty, and 
reputations, as well as the limited checks on a prosecutor's discretion”); Bennett L. Gershman, The 
Most Dangerous Power of the Prosecutor, 29 PACE L. REV. 1, 27 (2008) [hereinafter Gershman, The 
Most Dangerous Power] (“I have used this lecture to examine the role of the prosecutor in the charging 
process.  The cases I have discussed reveal an abuse of the prosecutor's charging power that, considered 
collectively, is unprecedented in U.S. criminal jurisprudence.”); Bennett L. Gershman, The Most 
Fundamental Change in the Criminal Justice System: The Role of the Prosecutor in Sentence 
Reduction, 5 CRIM. JUST. Fall 1990, at 2, 3 (“As every lawyer knows, the prosecutor is the most 
powerful figure in the American criminal justice system . . . . In carrying out this broad decision-making 
power, the prosecutor enjoys considerable independence.”); Bennett L. Gershman, The New 
Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 393 (1992) (“The power and prestige of the American prosecutor 
have changed dramatically over the past twenty years . . . . First, prosecutors wield vastly more power 
than ever before.  Second, prosecutors are more insulated from judicial control over their conduct. 
Third, prosecutors are increasingly immune to ethical restraints.”); Bennett Gershman, The 
Prosecutor's Duty of Silence, 79 ALB. L. REV. 1183 (2016) [hereinafter Gershman, The Prosecutor's 
Duty of Silence]. 
See also ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 143–
61 (2007) [hereinafter DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE]; KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE:
A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (Louisiana State University Press) (1969); Angela J. Davis, The American 
Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 408 (2001) 
[hereinafter Davis, The American Prosecutor] (“The charging decision is arguably the most important 
prosecutorial power and the strongest example of the influence and reach of prosecutorial discretion.”); 
Peter A. Joy, Prosecution Clinics: Dealing with Professional Role, 74 MISS. L.J. 955, 956 (2005) 
(“Extensive power, largely uncontrolled discretion, and the need to reign in partisan advocacy are three 
overarching issues implicit in the role of prosecutors.”); Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between 
Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 
WIS. L. REV. 399, 408 (2006) (“Prosecutors wield enormous power in the criminal justice system.  They 
decide whom to prosecute and what crimes to charge. They chart pretrial and trial strategies.  And they 
decide, or at least greatly influence, what the sentence will be through charging decisions, plea-
bargaining, or sentencing guideline choices.”); Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an 
Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. REV. 669, 678–82 (1992); Mitchell Stephens, Ignoring Justice: 
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Ethics of Charging, 35 N. KY. L. REV. 53 (2008); James Vorenberg, 
Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1525 (1981) (“[T]here are good 
reasons to see prosecutors’ virtually unlimited control over charging as inconsistent with a system of 
criminal procedure fair to defendants and to the public.”). 
2   See Bruce A. Green & Samuel J. Levine, Disciplinary Regulation of Prosecutors as a 
Remedy for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis, 14 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 143 (2016).  For some of Bruce Green’s more recent thoughts on these issues, see, e.g., Bruce 
A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics in Retrospect, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 461 (2017); Bruce Green &
Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51 (2016).
3   See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 
157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 977–78 (2009) (“Separation-of-powers concerns can also make bar authorities 
hesitate to intrude upon prosecutors’ province.”); Davis, The American Prosecutor, supra note 1, at 
412–15; Ellen S. Podgor, Race-ing Prosecutors’ Ethics Codes, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 461, 462–
64 (2009); Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective Prosecution: Enforcing 
Protection After United States v. Armstrong, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1071, 1119 (1997); Vorenberg, 
supra note 1, at 1546 (“Courts often justify their refusal to review prosecutorial discretion on the ground 
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law, the article found that state courts often exercise broader authority than federal 
courts in setting and enforcing standards governing prosecutors’ charging 
decisions.4  Indeed, as both a descriptive matter and a normative matter, in many 
states courts  review prosecutors’ charging decisions, through criminal adjudication 
as well as through the application and adoption of ethics rules.5 
The second part of the project, developed in a brief essay,6 considered the 
potential utility of disciplinary regulation as a remedy for abuses of prosecutorial 
discretion.  The essay analyzed whether, in comparison with other suggested 
approaches, disciplinary regulation might be a more appropriate response to the 
problem of abuse of prosecutorial power.7  The essay concluded that judicial 
supervision of prosecutors, through the disciplinary process, may not be vulnerable 
to some of the objections that have been leveled against other proposals, and thus 
may prove to be a preferable and more effective alternative.8 
that separation-of-powers concerns prohibit such review.”); Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional 
Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 761 (2001) (“[A]uthorities may sense a real separation 
of powers issue . . . . On occasion, prosecutors have directly raised the claim that the application of 
particular professional rules to them violates the principle of separation of powers.”). 
4   See Green & Levine, supra note 2, at 166–77.  For other recent studies, see, e.g., Valena E. 
Beety, Judicial Dismissal in the Interest of Justice, 80 MO. L. REV. 629 (2015); Darryl K. Brown, 
Judicial Power to Regulate Plea Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1225, 1234 (2016) (“sketch[ing] 
some of the history of executive authority over criminal charging to make the case that, especially in 
state criminal justice systems, a judicial power that is consistent with constitutional structure and 
historical practice could play a more meaningful role in regulating plea bargaining”); Darryl Brown, 
The Judicial Role in Criminal Charging and Plea Bargaining, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 63, 63–65 (2017) 
(noting that “[t]he standard answer to the question of what role judges have in determining the 
appropriateness of criminal charges is ‘virtually none’” and concluding “that this standard story 
misleads . . . [a]nd it is especially misleading with respect to state criminal justice systems, where the 
vast majority of prosecutions occur and some of which depart in notable ways from the judge's role in 
the federal criminal justice system”); Darryl K. Brown, What's the Matter with Kansas—and Utah?: 
Explaining Judicial Interventions in Plea Bargaining, 95 TEX. L. REV. 47 (2017); Andrew Manuel 
Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1303, 1364 (2018) (finding that 
“while thirteen states afford prosecutors the full range of flexibility in charge sliding, the majority 
(thirty-three) require judicial approval before charges can be amended or dismissed—with fifteen of 
those expressly granting judges the authority to reject charge bargains that they deem inappropriate” 
and that “[f]our other states . . . impose additional restraints”); Nancy J. King & Ronald F. Wright, The 
Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining: Managerial Judging and Judicial Participation in 
Negotiations, 95 TEX. L. REV. 325, 326 (2016) (finding that “judicial involvement in negotiations is 
now institutionalized and embedded in the very structure of many court systems in ways never dreamed 
of in the 1970s”); Anna Roberts, Dismissals as Justice, 69 ALA. L. REV. 327, 330 (2017) (finding that 
“[n]ineteen states have given trial courts the power to dismiss prosecutions for the sake of justice.”). 
5 See Green & Levine, supra note 2, at 177–82. 
6 See Samuel J. Levine, The Potential Utility of Disciplinary Regulation as a Remedy for 
Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (2017). 
7 See id. at 4–6. 
8 See id. at 7–12. 
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The current Essay takes the next step in the project, considering the substance 
and form of potential rules that would regulate prosecutors’ charging decisions.9  
Specifically, drawing on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Redondo-
Lemos,10 the Essay considers the possibility that courts should enact ethics rules 
targeted at two prosecutorial improprieties: arbitrary and capricious charging 
decisions, and discriminatory charging decisions. 
II. ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS CHARGING DECISIONS
A. The Problem
In Redondo-Lemos, the defendant pled guilty to an offense that carried a
statutory minimum sentence of five years.11  The district court found that, in plea 
bargaining with the defendant, the United States Attorney’s office acted arbitrarily 
and discriminated against the defendant on the basis of gender.12  As a remedy, the 
court sentenced the defendant to an 18 month sentence.13  On appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit framed the issue as “whether the district court may so second-guess the 
United States Attorney's exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”14 Distinguishing 
9   For critiques of current ethics rules, which are modeled on  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT Rule 3.8(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“The prosecutor in a criminal case shall refrain from 
prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause.”), see, e.g., Bennett 
L. Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 309 (2001) [hereinafter
Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth] (“[Y]ou never put a defendant to trial unless you [are]
personally convinced of [the defendant's] guilt.”); Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the
Prosecutor's Exercise of the Charging Discretion, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513, 530 (1993) (arguing
that the proper standard for proceeding with a criminal case should be the prosecutor's “moral certainty” 
of the defendant's perpetration of the crime); Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1588 (2003) (“Rule 3.8(a) deals with only one aspect of prosecutorial discretion—
the core decision whether to prosecute a criminal charge—and incorporates a standard that is both too
low and incomplete.”); Id. at 1589 (“[M]any would agree that charges should not be brought unless the
prosecutor reasonably believes that the accused is guilty of the crimes charged.”); Id. at 1589 n.79
(quoting MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 213 (1990)) (“[C]onscientious
prosecutors do not put the destructive engine of the criminal process into motion unless they are
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty.”); John Kaplan, The Prosecutorial
Discretion—A Comment, 60 NW. U. L. REV. 174, 178–79 (1965); Melilli, supra note 1, at 700
(“Prosecutors do not serve the interests of society by pursuing cases where the prosecutors themselves
have reasonable doubts as to the factual guilt of the defendants.”).  See also Niki Kuckes, The State of
Rule 3.8: Prosecutorial Ethics Reform Since Ethics 2000, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427 (2009); Samuel
J. Levine, Taking Prosecutorial Ethics Seriously: A Consideration of the Prosecutor's Ethical
Obligation to “Seek Justice” in a Comparative Analytical Framework, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1337 (2004).
10  United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended on denial of 
reh'g (May 11, 1992), overruled en banc on other grounds by United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 
1508 (9th Cir.1995), rev'd, 517 U.S. 456 (1996). 
11   See id. at 1297. 
12  See Id. at 1297–98. 
13  See id. at 1297. 
14  Id. 
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between two kinds of abuses, arbitrary and capricious charging decisions, and 
discriminatory charging decisions, the opinion offered a cleverly phrased 
conclusion: “We answer unequivocally: yes and no.”15 
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that both arbitrary and capricious charging 
decisions and discriminatory charging decisions are forms of unethical conduct that 
violate a defendant’s constitutional rights.16  Further, the court noted that “[i]n most 
circumstances . . . to say that there is a constitutional right is also to say that there is 
a judicially enforceable remedy.”17  However, the opinion added—strikingly—that 
a judicial remedy is “not always” available.18  The opinion identified both practical 
and constitutional obstacles that would curtail a judge’s ability to enforce a remedy 
for unethical charging decisions and, according to the court, would preclude a 
judicially enforceable remedy for arbitrary and capricious prosecutions.19 
First, raising practical considerations, the Ninth Circuit declared that 
“[p]rosecutorial charging and plea bargaining decisions are particularly ill-suited for 
broad judicial oversight [because] they involve exercises of judgment and discretion 
that are often difficult to articulate in a manner suitable for judicial evaluation . . . 
[including] careful professional judgment as to the strength of the evidence, the 
availability of resources, the visibility of the crime and the likely deterrent effect on 
the particular defendant and others similarly situated.”20  In addition, “[e]ven were 
it able to collect, understand and balance all of these factors, a court would find it 
nearly impossible to lay down guidelines to be followed by prosecutors in future 
cases.  We would be left with prosecutors not knowing when to prosecute and judges 
not having time to judge.”21 
15  Id. 
16  See id. at 1299–1300. 
17  Id. at 1299 (emphasis added). 
18  Id.  Although this conclusion may be unsettling, as a descriptive matter, the Ninth Circuit 
was undoubtedly correct in asserting that constitutional rights are not always enforceable through 
judicial remedies.  See id. at 1299 n.2 (citing Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64–
65 (1989); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388–90 (1983); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); 
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1003–04 (1979) (Rehnquist, J. concurring)). 
Indeed, as Justice Antonin Scalia’s once put it, “[t]he Court today continues its quixotic quest to 
right all wrongs and repair all imperfections through the Constitution.  Alas, the quest cannot succeed—
which is why some wrongs and imperfections have been called nonjusticiable.” Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 903 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
Justice Scalia contrasted the Constitution, in this regard, with “[a] Talmudic maxim instruct[ing] 
with respect to the Scripture: ‘Turn it over, and turn it over, for all is therein.’”  Id. (citation omitted). 
In short, Justice Scalia concluded, “A Divinely inspired text may contain the answers to all earthly 
questions, but the Due Process Clause most assuredly does not.”  Id.  Notably, Jewish legal scholars 
have explored, in a very different context, a somewhat similar question as to the existence of legal 
problems that have no legal remedy.  See, e.g., RABBI ASHER WEISS, MINCHAS ASHER, BAMIDBAR 220–
21 (2017). 
19  See Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d at 1299–1300. 
20  Id. at 1299. 
21  Id. 
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Second, the Ninth Circuit identified “an added constitutional consideration 
based on the peculiar relationship between the Office of the United States Attorney 
and the federal district courts.”22  Specifically,  “[t]he very breadth of the inquiry—
whether the prosecutor’s discretion was exercised in an arbitrary or capricious 
fashion—would require that the government divulge minute details about the 
process by which scores, perhaps hundreds, of charging decisions are made.”23 
Moreover, “[t]he court would also have to consider the validity of various rationales 
advanced for particular charging decisions, which would enmesh it deeply into the 
policies, practices and procedures of the United States Attorney's Office.”24  Finally, 
“the court would have to second-guess the prosecutor’s judgment in a variety of 
cases to determine whether the reasons advanced therefor are a subterfuge.  Such 
judicial entanglement in the core decisions of another branch of government—
especially as to those bearing directly and substantially on matters litigated in federal 
court—is inconsistent with the division of responsibilities assigned to each branch 
by the Constitution.”25 
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded, “[o]ur only available course is to 
deny the defendant a judicial remedy for what may be a violation of a constitutional 
right—not to have charging or plea bargaining decisions made in an arbitrary or 
capricious manner.”26  Instead, “[w]e trust that the United States Attorney . . .  and 
the Attorney General of the United States will . . . take whatever steps may be 
necessary to eliminate any constitutional infirmities in the charging process for this 
case and others.”27 
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis is susceptible to various responses and critiques, 
raising several important issues—some of which relate directly to the possibility of 
enacting ethics rules to regulate prosecutors’ charging decisions.  For example, as 
documented in the first part of this larger project,28 the opinion’s emphasis on 
separation of powers and the deference due to the executive branch may—not 
surprisingly—reflect an attitude that is more common among federal courts, such as 
the Ninth Circuit, than among state court judges.29  This difference in attitudes is 
22  Id. at 1299–1300. 
23  Id. at 1300. 
24  Id. 
25  Id. 
26  Id. 
27  Id. 
28  See Green & Levine, supra note 2. 
29  See supra note 4.  Notably, in the past year, one federal judge rejected three proffered plea 
agreements, on the grounds that “the scales of justice tip in favor of rejecting plea bargains unless I am 
presented with a counterbalance of case-specific factors sufficiently compelling to overcome the 
people's interest in participating in the criminal justice system.”  United States v. Stevenson, No. 2:17-
cr-00047, 2018 WL 1769371, at *1 (S.D.W. Va. Apr. 12, 2018);  see United States v. Walker, No. 
2:17-cr-00010, 2017 WL 2766452 (S.D.W. Va. June 26, 2017);  United States v. Wilmore, 282 
F.Supp.3d 937 (S.D.W. Va. Oct. 10, 2017).  For a critique of this approach, see Case Note, Criminal
Law—Plea Bargains—District Court Denies Plea Bargain Due to the Public Interest in Understanding 
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significant because state court judges have primary responsibility for the disciplinary 
regulation of lawyers.30 
Moreover, for a variety of reasons, as developed in the second part of this 
project, a number of the Ninth Circuit’s practical objections regarding judicial 
entanglement and confidentiality may prove less problematic in the context of 
disciplinary proceedings than in the adjudicatory context.31  Finally, it is less than 
clear that prosecutors should be granted the trust that the court seemed to place in 
their willingness to “take whatever steps may be necessary to eliminate any 
constitutional infirmities in the charging process for this case and others.”32 
In short, notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit’s separation-of-powers concern, 
state court judges may have the authority to exercise disciplinary review of arbitrary 
and capricious charging decisions.  Moreover, discipline may be a necessary 
response to a constitutional violation that appears resistant to an available 
adjudicatory remedy.33  If so, the next—and potentially more challenging—question 
is: What would the rule look like? 
the Opioid Epidemic—United States v. Walker, No. 2:17-cr-00010, 2017 WL 2766452 (S.D.W. Va. 
June 26, 2017), 131 HARV. L. REV. 2073 (2018). 
30  See Green & Levine, supra note 2, at 173–77. 
31  See Levine, supra note 6, at 7–11. 
32  Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d at 1300.  Indeed, the breadth and depth of scholarship 
documenting and proposing remedies for prosecutorial indiscretion in charging decisions, see sources 
cited supra note 1, attest to the ongoing need to implement mechanisms that go beyond the Ninth 
Circuit’s seemingly—and surprisingly—naïve trust and reliance on the sufficiency of prosecutors and 
prosecutorial offices, through their own initiatives, to remedy and work to prevent constitutional 
violations. Cf. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from 
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 873, 917 (2009) (proposing to “look[] within the 
prosecutor’s office itself to identify a viable corrective on prosecutorial overreaching[,]” but 
acknowledging difficulty in trying to “prompt prosecutors to change the view they have of 
themselves”); Podgor, supra note 3, at 474–75 (proposing “better discretion” through a “multi-
dimensional approach” to charging decisions, providing a “compassionate alternative,” but 
acknowledging that “[i]t is difficult to ensure that a prosecutor . . . will make use of the guidance”). 
33  Cf. Green & Levine, supra note 2, at 143 & nn.3–4 (citing several judicial opinions in support 
of the proposition that “courts favor professional discipline over adjudicatory remedies such as reversal 
of criminal convictions or suppression of evidence, which are often unavailable because of the harmless 
error doctrine and other limitations”); Levine, supra note 6, at 9–10 n.38 (quoting cases in which the 
United States Supreme Court identified the disciplinary process as an appropriate forum to remedy 
prosecutorial abuse of discretion in the absence of available adjudicatory remedies). 
In addition, a rule addressing arbitrary and capricious charging decisions would respond to a 
problematic aspect of prosecutorial discretion that scholars have recognized for decades, see, e.g., 
DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE, supra note 1; Vorenberg, supra note 1, at 1555 (concluding that “[g]iving 
prosecutors the power to invoke or deny punishment at their discretion raises the prospect that society's 
most fundamental sanctions will be imposed arbitrarily and capriciously”), which is likely exacerbated 
by the more recently recognized concern of cognitive bias among prosecutors.  See, e.g., Alafair S. 
Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1587 (2006); Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 
2 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 512 (2007); Peter A. Joy, The Criminal Discovery Problem: Is Legislation A 
Solution?, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 37 (2012); Sofia Yakren, Removing the Malice from Federal “Malicious 
Prosecution”: What Cognitive Science Can Teach Lawyers About Reform, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
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B. A Possible Rule
The most direct rule might simply state: “A prosecutor in a criminal case shall
not make charging decisions in an arbitrary and capricious manner.”  However, such 
a rule may be criticized as too broad to serve as a basis for discipline.  The issue of 
broad ethics provisions has been a matter of ongoing controversy at least since the 
drafting, and then adoption, of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility in 
1969.34  To be sure, unlike some broadly-worded ethics provisions,35 a rule 
prohibiting arbitrary and capricious prosecution would specify the substantive 
grounds for discipline.36  Moreover, one could envision cases  involving unequivocal 
instances of arbitrary and capricious charging—such as making a charging decision 
on the basis of a coin flip.37  Nevertheless, most instances of arbitrary and capricious 
charging would probably be more difficult to evaluate.  As the Ninth Circuit 
suggested, a determination that a prosecutor acted in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner could often require an examination and assessment of both specific factual 
359 (2015); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Why Do Brady Violations Happen?: Cognitive Bias and Beyond, 
CHAMPION, May 2013, at 12. 
34  See, e.g., CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 86–87 (West Publishing Co.) 
(1986) (“[I]f anything is clear, it is that many provisions of the lawyer codes are plainly imprecise.”); 
id. at 87 (“Unnecessary breadth is to be regretted in professional rules that can be used to deprive a 
person of his or her means of livelihood through sanctions that are universally regarded as 
stigmatizing.”); Theodore J. Schneyer, The Model Rules and Problems of Code Interpretation and 
Enforcement, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 939, 940 (finding that “on some subjects that were dealt with 
in the [Disciplinary Rules], but in terms so general as to require heroic interpretive effort, the Model 
Rules are not appreciably more specific—better written and with fewer internal inconsistencies, but 
not more specific”); Serena Stier, Legal Ethics: The Integrity Thesis, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 551, 593 (1991) 
(describing “the substantial indeterminacies left in the structure of professional ethics by both the Rules 
and the Code”); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468, 480 (1990) 
(describing the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility as “rife with vague and ambiguous 
terms,” but finding that, while the Model Rules’ “self-conscious[] attempt to bring more determinacy 
to the field of professional responsibility by adopting a rule-like structure . . . has eliminated some of 
the more pervasive ambiguities, vagueness and open-endedness remain”).  See generally, Samuel J. 
Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously: Broad Ethics Provisions and Unenumerated Ethical 
Obligations in a Comparative Hermeneutic Framework, 77 TUL. L. REV. 527 (2003). 
35  See Levine, supra note 34, at 535–37. 
36  As such, relying on a new rule articulating arbitrary and capricious decision making as 
grounds for discipline may compare favorably to attempts by “aggressive or creative disciplinary 
authorities” to interpret current rules to address otherwise unenumerated abuses of prosecutorial 
discretion.  See Green & Levine, supra note 2, at 153–54 (2016) (citing, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT 8.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (prohibiting “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration 
of justice”)). 
37  See Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d at 1299. 
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details and broader prosecutorial policies and patterns across a range of cases.38  
Thus, in all likelihood, the rule may be rarely enforced, if not unenforceable.39 
Still, it might be worthwhile to enact such a rule, even if it is unlikely to be 
enforced.  For example, the rule might serve to educate or remind prosecutors of 
their ethical duty not to act in an arbitrary and capricious manner.  Indeed, a number 
of ethics rules appear unlikely to be enforced, on their face or in practice,40 while 
some are altogether aspirational or otherwise unenforceable.41  In addition, the rule 
might serve an expressive purpose, demonstrating an ethical principle that is 
accepted by prosecutors and the collective bar, even in the absence of external 
enforcement.42 
38  See id. at 1299–1300. 
39  For an example of case that arguably could have provided enforceable grounds for a finding 
that the prosecutor made an arbitrary charging decision, see Bruce A. Green & Alafair S. Burke, The 
Community Prosecutor: Questions of Professional Discretion, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 285, 298–300 
(2012) (analyzing Commonwealth v. Agnew, 600 A.2d 1265, 1266 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)). 
40  See, e.g.,  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018)(“A lawyer shall 
provide competent representation to a client.  Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, 
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”). 
41  See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 6.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“A lawyer should 
aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono public legal services per year.”) (emphasis added); 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.5(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“The scope of the representation 
and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be 
communicated to the client, preferably in writing . . . .”) (emphasis added); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT 1.6(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“A lawyer may reveal information relating to the 
representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . .”) (emphasis 
added).  See generally Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Permissive Rules of Professional Conduct, 
91 MINN. L. REV. 265 (2006); Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethical Discretion Seriously: Ethical 
Deliberation As Ethical Obligation, 37 IND. L. REV. 21 (2003); Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethical 
Obligations Seriously: A Look at American Codes of Professional Responsibility Through a 
Perspective of Jewish Law and Ethics, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 165 (2007) [hereinafter Levine, Taking 
Ethical Obligations Seriously]; Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy 
Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
See also David Luban, Ethics and Malpractice, 12 MISS. C. L. REV. 151, 152 (1991) (making the 
“routine observation that the codes are drastically underenforced”).  Indeed, scholars have suggested 
that, in particular, disciplinary rules have been underenforced—if not largely unenforced—against 
prosecutors. See Green & Levine, supra note 2, at 155–56 nn.81–89 (documenting the “overwhelming 
consensus of opinion that ethics rules are underenforced against prosecutors”). 
42  Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“A lawyer's 
representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement 
of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities”). 
For a discussion of the expressive function of unenforced ethics rules, see Anita Bernstein, 
Sanctioning the Ambulance Chaser, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1545, 1563–65 (2008). Cf, Richard L. Abel, 
Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639, 667–68 (1981); Nelson P. Miller 
& Joan Vestrand, Of Shining Knights and Cunning Pettifoggers: The Symbolic World of the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 853 (2006); see also Lawrence A. Hamermesh, 
The ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility and the 2003 Changes to the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 35, 56–57 (2003).  See generally RICHARD H.
MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS (2015).  But see, e.g., Ted 
Schneyer, Policymaking and the Perils of Professionalism: The ABA's Ancillary Business Debate As A 
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III. DISCRIMINATORY CHARGING DECISIONS
A. The Problem
According to the Ninth Circuit, in contrast to arbitrary and capricious charging,
“[a] problem of a different order is presented by the district court's observation that 
the United States Attorney's Office discriminated on the basis of gender in exercising 
its prosecutorial discretion.  A claim of sex discrimination (or discrimination based 
on race, religion, or a similar characteristic) raises not only due process but also 
equal protection concerns.”43  As the court explained, “[t]roublesome as may be 
suspicions that prosecutorial discretion is being exercised in an arbitrary fashion, 
such concerns are heightened to an unacceptable level where there is an indication 
that the power to prosecute is being exercised to favor (or disfavor) particular classes 
of defendants on the basis of race, religion, gender, or similar suspect 
characteristics.”44  In short, “[t]he use of governmental authority to divide the 
population along suspect lines is a much more serious matter than the capricious 
exercise of power standing alone.”45 
In addition, on both practical and constitutional grounds, the court found that 
“it is judicially far more manageable to determine whether prosecutorial discretion 
is being exercised in a discriminatory fashion than to determine whether 
prosecutions are being selected arbitrarily or capriciously.”46  First, “[a]t a threshold 
level, whether or not there is a significant disparity in the treatment of classes of 
defendants can normally be determined on the basis of statistical evidence, without 
reference to the underlying facts of individual cases.”47  Second, “[i]f a disparity is 
found, the district court may well be able to resolve the matter so as to minimize, or 
avoid altogether, any inquiry into the intricacies of particular charging decisions. 
The court's entanglement with and supervision of the prosecutorial function can, in 
Case Study, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 363, 389 (1993) (“Adopting an ethics rule for purely expressive purposes 
jeopardizes the ABA's role as lawgiver for the legal profession.”). 
See also Bennett L. Gershman, Subverting Brady v. Maryland and Denying A Fair Trial: 
Studying the Schuelke Report, 64 MERCER L. REV. 683 (2013) [hereinafter Gershman, Subverting 
Brady] (“It may be that a prosecutor's own personal integrity and sense of fair play are the only effective 
checks on a prosecutor's crossing the ethical line.”); Gershman, The Most Dangerous Power, supra 
note 1, at 28 (“We want good prosecutors; we need good prosecutors. Despite internal and external 
controls, the most effective control over a prosecutor's abuse of power may lie in a prosecutor's own 
personal integrity, his or her commitment to the cause of justice, and in a prosecutorial culture that 
prizes justice and fair play over winning a case.”); Levine, Taking Ethical Obligations Seriously, supra 
note 41, at 202 (“[I]n place of a reluctant adherence to ethics rules out of a fear of possible enforcement, 
the community of lawyers must be willing to undertake a sincere commitment to ethical conduct, 
premised upon a shared sense of ethical values and principles.”). 
43  Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d at 1300. 
44  Id. at 1300. 
45  Id. at 1300–01. 
46  Id. at 1301. 
47  Id. 
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the exercise of sound judicial discretion, be kept to a minimum.”48  The Ninth 
Circuit’s opinion went on to describe this preferred method of judicial inquiry into 
discriminatory charging, emphasizing that “[i]n exercising [its] authority, the district 
court must be ever mindful that it is intruding upon the workings of a coordinate 
branch of government and must take all appropriate steps to minimize the 
intrusion.”49 
As to an adjudicative remedy for such an ethical violation, the court approved 
of  “giving the defendant the benefit of the plea bargain he would have received but 
for the discrimination,” but “caution[ed] . . . against broader, systemic remedies 
following a district court finding of selective prosecution.  Systemic relief in this 
area threatens to involve the district courts in the type of prosecutorial oversight 
which is fraught with separation of powers pitfalls.  We do not address whether such 
systemic remedies are ever appropriate.”50 
Notwithstanding the descriptive accuracy of many of the distinctions the 
Ninth’s Circuit’s opinion draws between arbitrary and capricious prosecution and 
discriminatory prosecution, in light of the acknowledgment that both involve 
violations of a defendant’s constitutional rights, it is not entirely clear why, in 
principle, the court insisted on the necessity of a remedy only in the case of 
discrimination.  Nevertheless, as the court suggested, discriminatory prosecution 
may, indeed, prove more amenable to judicial review in the adjudicatory context, 
and therefore may likewise be more amenable to a disciplinary rule.  If so, the 
question again arises: What would the rule look like? 
B. A Possible Rule
The most direct rule might state: “A prosecutor in a criminal case shall not
make charging decisions in a discriminatory manner, on the basis of race, sex, 
religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, marital status or socioeconomic status.”  In some ways, this rule might serve 
as a mirror image to a rule prohibiting arbitrary and capricious prosecution.  For 
example, given the absence of an adjudicatory remedy for arbitrary and capricious 
prosecution, there seems to be a particular need for discipline to remedy such 
misconduct.51  In contrast, given that, according to the Ninth Circuit, discriminatory 
charging is a form of prosecutorial misconduct that is subject to judicial 
investigation, and for which there is an available adjudicatory remedy, it may be 
difficult to identify the need for, or purpose of, a disciplinary rule.52 
48  Id. 
49  Id. at 1302. 
50  Id. at 1302–03. 
51  See id. at 1299. 
52  For scholarship addressing the problem of discriminatory prosecution, see, e.g., Shelby A. 
Dickerson Moore, Questioning the Autonomy of Prosecutorial Charging Decisions: Recognizing the 
Need to Exercise Discretion-Knowing There Will Be Consequences for Crossing the Line, 60 LA. L.
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It could be proposed that the possibility of discipline would have an additional 
deterrent effect on discriminatory charging, or that it would provide an additional 
enforcement mechanism, beyond the relatively modest adjudicatory remedy that the 
Ninth Circuit opinion allows for.53  However, the apparent ineffectiveness of other 
ethics rules regulating prosecutors may indicate otherwise.  For example, ABA 
Model Rule 3.8 (d),54 requiring prosecutors to disclose information “that tends to 
negate the guilt of the accused,” might have been expected to reinforce prosecutors’ 
constitutional obligations to disclose material exculpatory evidence under Brady v. 
Maryland.55  In fact, though, the problem of Brady violations persists,56 and given 
REV. 371 (2000); Podgor, supra note 3; Poulin, supra note 3.  See also Vorenberg, supra note 1, at 
1555 (concluding that “[g]iving prosecutors the power to invoke or deny punishment at their discretion 
raises the prospect that . . . the least favored members of the community—racial and ethnic minorities, 
social outcasts, the poor—will be treated most harshly”). 
53  Cf. Levine, supra note 6, at 8 (suggesting that “disciplinary rules may provide an incentive 
for prosecutors' offices to undertake restructuring in an effort to comply with the rules and avoid the 
sanction of courts” and thus, “disciplinary rules might help provide an enforcement mechanism for 
some of the internal changes scholars have envisioned”). 
54  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 3.8(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018): 
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence 
or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or 
mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the 
tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the 
prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal. 
55  See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  For a discussion of how, in the ABA’s view, 
the rule expands on prosecutors’ Brady obligations, see ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics &Prof’l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (2009). 
56  A large body of scholarship has addressed the ongoing problem of Brady violations.  Here 
too, Ben Gershman’s work has been particularly notable.  See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating 
Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531 (2007): 
By any measure, Brady v. Maryland has not lived up to its expectations.  Brady's 
announcement of a constitutional duty on prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence to 
defendants embodies, more powerfully than any other constitutional rule, the core of the 
prosecutor's ethical duty to seek justice rather than victory.  Nevertheless, prosecutors over 
the years have not accorded Brady the respect it deserves.  Prosecutors have violated its 
principles so often that it stands more as a landmark to prosecutorial indifference and abuse 
than a hallmark of justice. 
Id. at 531.  See also Bennett L. Gershman, Educating Prosecutors and Supreme Court Justices About 
Brady v. Maryland, 13 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 517 (2012); Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. 
Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685 (2006); Gershman, Subverting Brady, supra note 42; Cynthia E. 
Jones, Here Comes the Judge: A Model for Judicial Oversight and Regulation of the Brady Disclosure 
Duty, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 87, 87 (2017) (“Every year, there are numerous reported opinions where the 
court finds that a prosecutor has failed to disclose favorable information to the defense.”); Peter A. Joy, 
Brady and Jailhouse Informants: Responding to Injustice, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 619 (2007); Joy, 
supra note 33; Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A 
Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 697 (1987) (stating that there are “enough reported cases containing 
strong evidence of intentional prosecutorial withholding of exculpatory evidence and presentation of 
false evidence to demonstrate that this kind of misconduct occurs frequently enough”); Joseph R. 
Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose 
Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833 (1997); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial 
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how rarely Rule 3.8 (d) is enforced,57 there is little reason to believe that the risk of 
discipline deters misconduct. 
Conversely, to the extent that courts might be willing to exercise a more robust 
form of disciplinary review of discriminatory charging, given that such conduct is a 
blatant violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights, perhaps a rule addressing 
discriminatory charging would not be necessary, as the prosecutor’s conduct would 
be subject to discipline under a variety of other rules—e.g., rules that prohibit 
“engag[ing] in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice,”58 or 
“engag[ing] in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is 
harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, 
ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or 
socioeconomic status in conduct related to the practice of law.”59  Yet again, 
however, even if a rule prohibiting discriminatory prosecution would not serve an 
enforcement function—either because it would likely remain unenforced or because 
it may prove unnecessary as an enforcement mechanism—perhaps such a rule would 
still serve an educational or expressive purpose.60 
Disclosure Obligations, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1322 (2011) (“The subject of seemingly perpetual 
discussion, debate, scholarly articles, and conferences, prosecutorial disclosure obligations 
increasingly have become the focus in high publicity cases.  Failure to disclose significant evidence to 
the defense in numerous cases has resulted in reversal, dismissal, and years of incarceration for the 
wrongfully convicted.”); Ellen Yaroshefsky & Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors' Ethics in Context: 
Influences on Prosecutorial Disclosure, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN
CONTEXT 269–92 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012); Symposium, New Perspectives on 
Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: What Really Works?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1943 (2010). 
57  See Green & Levine, supra note 2, at 155–56 n.81–89. 
58  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 8.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
59  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) Cf. Green & Levine, supra 
note 2, at 153–54 (suggesting that “aggressive or creative disciplinary authorities might address 
perceived abuses of discretionary authority under at least three other rules”) (citing conflict of interest 
rules: (citing conflict of interest rules: MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.7, 1.9, 1.10 & 1.11 (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2018); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 4.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“In representing 
a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, 
or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a 
person.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 8.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018)). 
60  See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
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IV. CONCLUSION
Among the various elements of prosecutorial power, the charging decision may 
stand as the most significant, both because of its consequences61 and because of the 
discretionary, if not largely unfettered and often unreviewable, nature of the decision 
making process.62  In Bennett Gershman’s memorable articulation: 
[A]s the most powerful figure in the American criminal justice system, the
prosecutor has the power to employ, lawfully, “the most terrible
instruments of government” to deprive persons of their liberty, destroy
their reputations, and even bring about their death. . . . And a prosecutor's
discretion to exercise these powers is virtually unlimited, and rarely
second-guessed by the courts.  Indeed, the ability of courts, disciplinary
bodies, and other investigative agencies to impose significant restraints on
a prosecutor's use of his powers is so negligible that it makes the
prosecutor accountable to himself alone.63
In one of his final Supreme Court opinions, addressing a different form of 
executive power, Justice Anthony Kennedy recently observed that: 
There are numerous instances in which the statements and actions of 
Government officials are not subject to judicial scrutiny or intervention. 
That does not mean those officials are free to disregard the Constitution 
and the rights it proclaims and protects. The oath that all officials take to 
adhere to the Constitution is not confined to those spheres in which the 
Judiciary can correct or even comment upon what those officials say or 
do.64 
In light of current limitations on implementing external mechanisms to impose 
meaningful limits on prosecutorial discretion and to deter and prevent the abuse of 
discretion, Gershman has concluded that “the most effective control over a 
prosecutor's abuse of power may lie in a prosecutor's own personal integrity, his or 
her commitment to the cause of justice, and in a prosecutorial culture that prizes 
justice and fair play over winning a case.”65  In a similar vein, Justice Kennedy 
declared, “the very fact that an official may have broad discretion, discretion free 
from judicial scrutiny, makes it all the more imperative for him or her to adhere to 
61  See, e.g., Davis, The American Prosecutor, supra note 1; Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral 
Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1197 (2016). 
62  See supra note 1. 
63  Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty of Silence, supra note 1, at 1214 (quoting MONROE H.
FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 286 (4th ed. 2010)). 
64  Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424 (2018) (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
65  See Gershman, The Most Dangerous Power, supra note 1, at 28. 
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the Constitution and to its meaning and its promise.”66  As an alternative, or in 
addition to these suggestions, this Essay builds on earlier parts of a larger project67 
to propose that increased disciplinary review, predicated on the adoption and 
enforcement of new ethics rules, may provide an effective means of regulating the 
prosecutor’s exercise of charging discretion. 
66  Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2424 (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
67  See Green & Levine, supra note 2; Levine, supra note 6. 
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